Many classical social choice correspondences are resolute only in the case of two alternatives and an odd number of individuals. Thus, in most cases, they admit several resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a tie-breaking rule, satisfying different properties. In this paper we look for classes of social choice correspondences which admit resolute refinements fulfilling suitable versions of anonymity and neutrality. In particular, supposing that individuals and alternatives have been exogenously partitioned into subcommittees and subclasses, we find out arithmetical conditions on the sizes of subcommittees and subclasses that are necessary and sufficient for making any social choice correspondence which is efficient, anonymous with respect to subcommittees, neutral with respect to subclasses and possibly immune to the reversal bias admit a resolute refinement sharing the same properties.
Introduction
Consider a committee having h ≥ 2 members who have to select one or more elements within a set of n ≥ 2 alternatives. Assume further that the procedure used to make that choice only depends on committee members' preferences on alternatives and that such preferences are expressed as linear orders. Calling preference profile any list of h preferences, each of them associated with one of the individuals in the committee, the selection procedure can be represented by a social choice correspondence (scc), that is, a function from the set of preference profiles to the set of nonempty subsets of the set of alternatives.
In the literature many sccs have been proposed and studied. Most of them satisfy three requirements which are considered strongly desirable by social choice theorists, namely efficiency, anonymity and neutrality. Recall that a scc is said efficient if, for every preference profile, it does not select an alternative which is unanimously beaten by another alternative; anonymous if the identities of individuals are irrelevant to determine the social outcome, that is, it selects the same social outcome for any pair of preference profiles such that we get one from the other by permuting individual names; neutral if alternatives are equally treated, that is, for every pair of preference profiles such that we get one from the other by permuting alternative names, the social outcomes associated with them coincide up to the considered permutation.
Since in many cases collective decision processes are required to select a unique alternative, an important role in social choice theory is played by resolute sccs, namely those sccs associating a singleton with any preference profile. Unfortunately, resoluteness is rarely satisfied by classical sccs. For instance, as described in Section 3, the Borda, the Copeland, the Minimax and the Kemeny sccs are all efficient, anonymous and neutral but they are resolute if and only if the number of alternatives is two and the number of individuals is odd. As a consequence, if the members of a committee want to use a classical scc to make their collective choice and a unique outcome is needed, then they also need a tie-breaking rule to apply to the alternatives selected by the chosen scc.
The concept of tie-breaking rule can be naturally formalized in terms of refinement of a scc. Let C and C ′ be two sccs. We say that C ′ is a refinement of C if, for every preference profile, the set of alternatives selected by C ′ is a subset of the set of alternatives selected by C. Thus, refinements of C can be thought as a way to reduce the ambiguity in the choice made by C. In particular, resolute refinements of C eliminate any ambiguity leading to a unique winner, so that they can be identified with tie-breaking rules. Of course, if C is not resolute, then it admits more than one resolute refinement. Thus, an interesting issue to address is to understand whether it is possible to find resolute refinements of C which satisfy suitable properties making them more appealing.
In this paper we focus on the properties of efficiency, anonymity and neutrality previously described as well as on the immunity to the reversal bias. Recall that a scc is said immune to the reversal bias if it never associates the same singleton both with a preference profile and with the one obtained by it assuming a complete change in each committee member's mind about his/her own ranking of alternatives (that is, the best alternative gets the worst, the second best alternative gets the second worst, and so on). The immunity to the reversal bias, first introduced by Saari (1994) , has not been widely explored yet and there are actually only a couple of papers completed devoted to it, namely Saari and Barney (2003) and Bubboloni and Gori (2016) to which we refer for a wide discussion on the significance of such a property.
It is immediate to understand that any resolute refinement of an efficient scc is efficient. However, resolute refinements of anonymous [neutral; immune to the reversal bias] sccs are not generally anonymous [neutral; immune to the reversal bias]. That happens, for instance, for resolute refinements built using two standard methods to break ties. The first method, proposed by Moulin (1988) , is based on a tie-breaking agenda, that is, an exogenously given ranking of the alternatives; the second one, is instead based on the preferences of one of the individuals appointed as tie-breaker. Of course, the resolute refinements built through a tie-breaking agenda fail to be neutral while the ones built through a tie-breaker fail to be anonymous. Note also that an interesting result due to Moulin (1983) states that the existence of an efficient, anonymous, neutral and resolute scc is equivalent to the strong condition gcd(h, n!) = 1 (Theorem 6). Thus, in most cases, given an efficient scc, we cannot get any anonymous and neutral resolute refinement of it. As a consequence, in those cases, we can only look for sccs satisfying weaker versions of the principles of anonymity and neutrality. Bubboloni and Gori (2015) propose a possible way to weaken the principle of anonymity by assuming that individuals are divided into subcommittees and requiring that, within each subcommittee, individuals equally influence the final collective decision, while people in different subcom-mittees may have a different decision power. They also propose a weaker version of the principle of neutrality by assuming that alternatives are divided into subclasses and requiring that within each subclass alternatives are equally treated, while alternatives in different subclasses may have a different treatment 1 . These versions of anonymity and neutrality are certainly natural and actually used in many practical collective decision processes. That happens, for instance, when a committee has a president or when a committee evaluates job candidates discriminating on their gender. In the former example committee members can be thought to be divided in two subcommittees (the president in the first, all the others in the second) with anonymous individuals within each of them; in the latter example alternatives can be thought to be divided in two subclasses (the women in the first, the men in the second) such that no alternative has an exogenous advantage with respect to the other alternatives in the same subclass.
In this paper, we fist find out arithmetical conditions on the sizes of subcommittees and subclasses that are necessary for the existence of a resolute scc which is efficient, anonymous with respect to subcommittees and neutral with respect to subclasses [and immune to the reversal bias] (Theorem 7). We then prove that the same conditions assure that any efficient scc which is anonymous with respect to subcommittees and neutral with respect to subclasses [and immune to the reversal bias] admits a resolute refinement having the same properties (Theorem 8). Those results, among other things, generalize the previously mentioned theorem by Moulin. While the proof of the first result is simple and natural, the proof of the second one, along with other interesting results, require a certain amount of work. The arguments are strongly based on the algebraic approach developed in Gori (2014, 2015) where, in the framework of social welfare functions, the notion of action of a group on a set is naturally and fruitfully used to study problems concerning anonymity and neutrality and weaker versions of them, along with reversal symmetry. Here we adapt that algebraic reasoning to the framework of sccs by defining a general and wide-ranging notion of consistency of a scc with respect to a group (Section 2.4), which includes anonymity with respect to subcommittees, neutrality with respect to subclasses and immunity to the reversal bias as particular instances. That notion of consistency provides a unified framework which allows on the one hand to make proofs simpler and more direct, and on the other hand to obtain very general results (Theorem 15). It is worth noting that the algebraic approach developed in the paper also provides methods to potentially build all the desired resolute refinements. In Sections 6.2 and 6.3.1 we discuss some examples that explain how the theoretical results can be explicitly applied.
Preliminary definitions and facts
Throughout the paper, given A, B and C sets and f : A → B and g : B → C functions, we denote by gf the right-to-left composition of f and g, that is, the function from A to C defined, for every a ∈ A, as gf (a) = g(f (a)).
Groups and permutations
All the results from group theory used in the paper can be found in Jacobson (1974, Chapter 1) . Below, we briefly recall some well known concepts that will be sufficient for a complete comprehension of the paper until the end of Section 4, where the main theorems of the paper are stated and commented.
A finite group G is a finite set endowed with a binary operation satisfying associativity, admitting neutral element 1 G and such that every element has inverse. Consider g ∈ G. We set g 0 = 1 G and, for every s ∈ N, we denote by g s the product of g by itself s times. We also denote by |g| the order of g, that is, the minimum s ∈ N such that g s = 1 G . A subset U of G is called a subgroup of G if U is closed under the operation in G, that is, if for every u 1 , u 2 ∈ U, we have u 1 u 2 ∈ U. If U is a subgroup of G, we use the notation U ≤ G.
Let X be a nonempty finite set. Then Sym(X) denotes the group of the bijective functions from X to itself, with product defined, for every σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ Sym(X), by σ 1 σ 2 ∈ Sym(X). The neutral element of Sym(X) is given by the identity function, denoted by id. Sym(X) is called the symmetric group on X and its elements are called permutations on X. For every k ∈ N, the group Sym({1, . . . , k}) is simply denoted by S k . The elements in S k are usually written via the standard representation through disjoint cycles. For instance, ψ = (134)(26) ∈ S 6 is the permutation defined by ψ(1) = 3, ψ(3) = 4, ψ(4) = 1, ψ(2) = 6, ψ(6) = 2, ψ(5) = 5.
Preference relations
From now on, let n ∈ N with n ≥ 2 be fixed, and let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of names of alternatives. A preference relation on N is a linear order on N , that is, a complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation. The set of preference relations on N is denoted by L(N ). Given q ∈ L(N ) and x, y ∈ N , we usually write x q y instead of (x, y) ∈ q, as well as x ≻ q y instead of (x, y) ∈ q and x = y, and we say that x is preferred to y according to q if x ≻ q y.
Let q ∈ L(N ) be fixed. For every ψ ∈ S n , we define ψq as the element of L(N ) such that, for every x, y ∈ N , (x, y) ∈ ψq if and only if (ψ −1 (x), ψ −1 (y)) ∈ q. Consider the order reversing permutation in S n , that is, the permutation ρ 0 ∈ S n defined, for every r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, as ρ 0 (r) = n − r + 1. Obviously, we have |ρ 0 | = 2. Note that ρ 0 has exactly one fixed point when n is odd and no fixed point when n is even. For instance, if n = 3, we have ρ 0 = (13) and 2 is the only fixed point; if n = 4, we have ρ 0 = (14)(23) and no fixed point. Define Ω = {id, ρ 0 }, where id ∈ S n . Note that Ω ≤ S n is a commutative group which admits as unique subgroups {id} and Ω. We define qρ 0 ∈ L(N ) as the element in L(N ) such that, for every x, y ∈ N , (x, y) ∈ qρ 0 if and only if (y, x) ∈ q; q id = q. Note that, by definition, for every x, y ∈ N and ψ ∈ S n , we have that x ≻ q y if and only if ψ(x) ≻ ψq ψ(y); x ≻ q y if and only if y ≻ qρ0 x.
The function rank q : N → {1, . . . , n} is defined, for every x ∈ N , by rank q (x) = |{y ∈ N : y q x}|.
Such a function is called the rank of x ∈ N in q and is bijective. Note that, for every ψ ∈ S n , rank ψq (x) = rank q (ψ −1 (x)) and rank qρ0 (x) = ρ 0 (rank q (x)). Consider now the set of vectors with n distinct components in N given by
and think each vector (x r ) n r=1 ∈ V(N ) as a column vector, that is,
and the function f 2 : S n → L(N ) associating with σ ∈ S n the preference relation {(σ(r 1 ), σ(r 2 )) ∈ N × N : r 1 , r 2 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, r 1 ≤ r 2 } are bijective, so that, in particular, |S n | = |V(N )| = |L(N )| = n!. Note that
. . , n}, rank q (σ(r)) = r}. Note also that, for every ψ ∈ S n and ρ ∈ Ω, if f −1 1 (q) = [x 1 , . . . , x n ] T , then
Thus, by the functions f 1 and f 2 we are allowed to identify the preference relation q both with the vector f −1 1 (q) and with the permutation f −1 2 (q), and to naturally interpret the products ψq and qρ in V(N ) and in S n . For instance, if n = 4 and q = {(4, 2), (2, 1), (1, 3), (4, 1), (4, 3), (2, 3), (4, 4), (2, 2), (1, 1), (3, 3)} ∈ L({1, 2, 3, 4}), then q is identified with both f −1 1 (q) = [4, 2, 1, 3] T ∈ V({1, 2, 3, 4}) and f −1 2 (q) = (143) ∈ S 4 , so that 4 has rank 1, 2 has rank 2, 1 has rank 3, and 3 has rank 4 in q. Thus, if ψ = (342) ∈ S 4 , then we can write On the one hand, identifying preference relations with vectors makes computations easy and intuitive. On the other hand, identifying preference relations with permutations allows to transfer the group properties of S n to the products between preference relations and permutations. In particular, by associativity and cancellation laws, for every ψ 1 , ψ 2 ∈ S n and ρ 1 , ρ 2 ∈ {id, ρ 0 }, we have that ψ 1 q = ψ 2 q if and only if ψ 1 = ψ 2 ; qρ 1 = qρ 2 if and only if ρ 1 = ρ 2 ; (ψ 2 ψ 1 )q = ψ 2 (ψ 1 q); q(ρ 1 ρ 2 ) = (qρ 1 )ρ 2 ; (ψ 1 q)ρ 1 = ψ 1 (qρ 1 ). For every ψ ∈ S n , ρ ∈ Ω and X ⊆ L(N ), we define ψXρ = {ψqρ ∈ L(N ) : q ∈ X}. Note that, for every ψ ∈ S n , ρ ∈ Ω and X ⊆ Y ⊆ L(N ), ψXρ ⊆ ψY ρ so that, in particular, ψL(N )ρ = L(N ). Given now ψ ∈ S n and ρ ∈ {id, ρ 0 }, we finally emphasize that the above discussion makes the products ψq and qρ have interesting interpretations. Indeed, if q represents the preferences of a certain individual, then ψq represents the preferences that the individual would have if, for every x ∈ N , alternative x were called ψ(x); qρ represents the preferences that the individual would have if, for every r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the alternative whose rank is r is moved to rank ρ(r).
Preference profiles
From now on, let h ∈ N with h ≥ 2 be fixed, and let H = {1, . . . , h} be the set of names of individuals. A preference profile is an element of L(N ) h . The set L(N ) h is denoted by P. If p ∈ P and i ∈ H, the i-th component of p is denoted by p i and represents the preferences of individual i. Any p ∈ P can be identified with the n × h matrix whose i-th column is the column vector representing p i for all i ∈ H.
Let us consider the set G = S h × S n × Ω. Note that G is a group through component-wise multiplication, that is, defining for every (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 ) ∈ G and (ϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 2 ) ∈ G, (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 )(ϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 2 ) = (ϕ 1 ϕ 2 , ψ 1 ψ 2 , ρ 1 ρ 2 ). For every (ϕ, ψ, ρ) ∈ G and p ∈ P, define p (ϕ,ψ,ρ) ∈ P as the preference profile such that, for every i ∈ H,
Thus, the preference profile p (ϕ,ψ,ρ) is obtained by p according to the following rules (to be applied in any order): for every i ∈ H, individual i is renamed ϕ(i); for every x ∈ N , alternative x is renamed ψ(x); for every r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, alternatives whose rank is r are moved to rank ρ(r). For instance, if n = 3, h = 7 and p =   3 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 2 2   , ϕ = (134)(25), ψ = (12), ρ = ρ 0 = (13), then we have p (ϕ,id,id) =   3 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 2 2   , p (id,ψ,id) =   3 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 1   , p (id,id,ρ0) =   1 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 1 2 3 2 1 1   , p (ϕ,ψ,ρ0) =   2 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 3 3 3 1 3 1 2 2 2   .
As it is easy to verify, if n = 2, then p (id,ρ0,id) = p (id,id,ρ0) for all p ∈ P; if n ≥ 3, then there do not exist ϕ ∈ S h and ψ ∈ S n such that, for every p ∈ P, p (ϕ,ψ,id) = p (id,id,ρ0) . In other words, top-down reversing preference profiles cannot be reduced, in general, to a change in individuals and alternatives names. In what follows, we write the i-th component p (ϕ,ψ,ρ) simply as p
Social choice correspondences
A social choice correspondence (scc) is a function from P to the set of the nonempty subsets of N . The set of sccs is denoted by C. Given C ∈ C, we say that C is resolute if, for every p ∈ P, |C(p)| = 1. We say that C ′ ∈ C is a refinement of C if, for every p ∈ P, C ′ (p) ⊆ C(p). Note that C admits a unique resolute refinement if and only if C is resolute.
Consider now P ar ∈ C defined, for every p ∈ P, as
P ar is called the Pareto scc. Note that P ar(p) contains the alternatives ranked first in at least one p i . In particular, P ar(p) = ∅.
We say that C ∈ C is efficient if C is a refinement of P ar. Thus, an efficient scc never selects an alternative which is unanimously beaten by another one. Of course, every refinement of an efficient scc is efficient.
and we say that C is anonymous with respect to Y , briefly Y -anonymous, if, for every p ∈ P and ϕ ∈ V (Y ), we have C(p (ϕ,id,id) ) = C(p).
Thus, interpreting the elements of Y as subcommittees, we have that Y -anonymous sccs attribute the same decision power to individuals in the same subcommittee.
and we say that C is neutral with respect to Z, briefly Z-neutral, if, for every p ∈ P and ψ ∈ W (Z), we have 3 C(p (id,ψ,id) ) = ψC(p).
Thus, interpreting the elements of Z as subclasses, we have that Z-neutral sccs cannot distinguish among alternatives in the same subclass. Note that
Following Bubboloni and Gori (2016) , we finally say that C is immune to the reversal bias if, for every p ∈ P with |C(p)| = 1, we have
In other words, a scc is immune to the reversal bias if it never associates the same unique winner both with a preference profile p and with the preference profile obtained by p reversing every individual preference.
Analysis of some classical sccs
The Pareto (P ar), the Borda (Bor), the Copeland (Cop), the Minimax (M in) and the Kemeny (Kem) sccs are classical sccs deeply studied in the literature. Recall that P ar is defined in (1) while, for every p ∈ P, we have that 4
where, for every p ∈ P, x, y ∈ N and q ∈ L(N ), we have set
It is well-known that the following proposition holds true. In particular, all the considered sccs are anonymous with respect to any partition of H and neutral with respect to any partition of N . In the next propositions, we find out conditions on the number of individuals and alternatives which are necessary and sufficient to make those sccs immune to the reversal bias and resolute.
Proposition 2. P ar, Bor, Cop and Kem are immune to the reversal bias.
Proof. That fact for the Borda and Copeland sccs is proved in Bubboloni and Gori (2016, Proposition 3) . We are thus left with considering C ∈ {P ar, Kem} and showing that if, for some p ∈ P and x, y ∈ N, we have C(p) = {x} and C(p (id,id,ρ0) ) = {y}, then x = y. In what follows, for shortness, for every p ∈ P, we will write p ρ0 instead of p (id,id,ρ0) .
Assume that P ar(p) = {x} and P ar(p ρ0 ) = {y} for some p ∈ P and x, y ∈ N . Then, in particular, we have that rank p1 (x) = 1 and rank p ρ 0 1 (y) = 1. Thus, rank p1 (y) = n = 1 = rank p1 (x), which says x = y.
Consider now Kem. We start defining, for every p ∈ P, the nonempty subset of L(N )
and showing that, for every p ∈ P,
Indeed, given p ∈ P, it is immediately checked that, for every x, y ∈ N , we have w p ρ 0 (x, y) = w p (y, x). As a consequence, for every q ∈ L(N ), we have that
Given nowq ∈ K(p)ρ 0 , note thatq = q * ρ 0 for a suitable q * ∈ K(p). Then, for every q ∈ L(N ), we
The same argument applied to p ρ0 gives K(p ρ0 )ρ 0 ⊆ K(p). It follows that K(p ρ0 ) ⊆ K(p)ρ 0 , which completes the proof of (2). Assume now that Kem(p) = {x} and Kem(p ρ0 ) = {y} for some p ∈ P and x, y ∈ N . Pick q * ∈ K(p) and note that rank q * (x) = 1. On the other hand, by (2), q * ρ 0 ∈ K(p ρ0 ), so that rank q * ρ0 (y) = 1, that is, rank q * (y) = n. Hence the alternatives x and y are ranked differently by q * , which implies x = y.
The following result is proved by Bubboloni and Gori (2016, Theorem A) .
Proposition 3. M in is immune to the reversal bias if and only if h ≤ 3 or n ≤ 3 or (h, n) ∈ {(4, 4), (5, 4), (7, 4), (5, 5)}.
Proposition 4. P ar is not resolute.
Proof. Consider p ∈ P such that rank p1 (1) = 1 and rank p2 (2) = 1. Then {1, 2} ⊆ P ar(p) so that P ar is not resolute.
Then C is resolute if and only if n = 2 and h is odd.
Proof. If n = 2 and h is odd, then Bor, Cop, M in and Kem agree with the simple majority so that they are resolute. We are then left with proving that if h is even or n ≥ 3, then none among Bor, Cop , M in, Kem is resolute.
Assume at first h even. Define
and consider any preference profile p ∈ P such that |{i ∈ H :
It is immediate to verify that Bor(p) = Cop(p) = M in(p) = {1, 2}. Moreover, it can be checked that
. Assume now n ≥ 3 and h odd. Then there exist r, t ∈ {0, 1} with t ≤ r and k ∈ N 0 such that h = 3 + 2r + 2t + 6k. Define
and consider any preference profile p ∈ P such that
Main problem and results
As shown in the previous section resoluteness is not generally satisfied by classical social choice correspondences. If a scc C is not resolute, then it admits different resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a tie-breaking rule for C. As a consequence, one may wonder whether it is possible to find resolute refinements having special and desirable properties. An interesting result about the Pareto scc and the properties of anonymity and neutrality is proved by Moulin (1983, p.23) .
Theorem 6. P ar admits an anonymous and neutral resolute refinement if and only if gcd(h, n!) = 1
An important consequence of Theorem 6 is that any efficient scc has anonymous and neutral resolute refinements only if (3). Unfortunately, since (3) is a very strong arithmetical condition on the number of individuals and the number of alternatives, in most cases, no anonymous and neutral refinement is available 5 . When a scc does not have anonymous and neutral resolute refinements, one may however focus on those resolute refinements satisfying suitable weaker versions of anonymity and neutrality. Indeed, the present paper is devoted to that type of inquiry. More precisely, having in mind the properties discussed in Section 2.4, we address the following problem.
Main problem. Given a scc C, a partition Y of individuals and a partition Z of alternatives, find conditions on C, Y and Z assuring that C admits a resolute refinement which is Y -anonymous and Z-neutral [and immune to the reversal bias].
The first result we propose provides arithmetical conditions on the structure of the partitions that are necessary for the existence of resolute refinements of the Pareto scc which are anonymous and neutral with respect to those partitions [and immune to the reversal bias].
(ii) If P ar admits a resolute refinement which is Y -anonymous, Z-neutral and immune to the reversal bias, then
Proof. (i) Let C be resolute, efficient, Y -anonymous and Z-neutral. Assume by contradiction that (4) does not hold true. Then there exists a prime number π which divides gcd gcd(|Y j |) s j=1 , |Z k * |! . Then, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , s}, π | |Y j | and π ≤ |Z k * |. Consider π distinct alternatives x 1 , . . . , x π ∈ Z k * and denote by y 1 , . . . , y n−π the remaining alternatives. For every j ∈ {1, . . . , s}, let h j = |Y j | and i j 1 , . . . , i j hj be the list of all the elements in Y j . Define
and ψ = (x 1 . . . x π ) ∈ S n . Note that ϕ ∈ V (Y ) and ψ ∈ W (Z). Consider then the preference relation p 0 ∈ L(N ) defined by
and the preference profile p defined, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , s} and r ∈ {1, . . . , h j }, by p i j r = ψ r−1 p 0 . A simple check shows that P ar(p) = {x 1 , . . . , x π } and that p = (p (ϕ,id,id) ) (id,ψ,id) .
Let now x * ∈ N be such that C(p) = {x * }. Then
Thus x * is a fixed point of ψ belonging to {x 1 , . . . , x π }, a contradiction.
(ii) Let C be resolute, efficient, Y -anonymous, Z-neutral and immune to the reversal bias. Assume, by contradiction, that (5) does not hold true. Then there exists a prime number π which divides gcd gcd(|Y j |) s j=1 , lcm(|Z k * |!, 2) . If π ≥ 3, then we have that, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , s}, π | |Y j | and π ≤ |Z k * |. Thus, we proceed exactly as in the proof of (i) and find the contradiction. If instead π = 2, then, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , s}, h j = |Y j | is even. Let i j 1 , . . . , i j hj be the list of all the elements in Y j . Let ϕ defined as in (6) and ψ = id ∈ S n . Note that ϕ ∈ V (Y ) and ψ ∈ W (Z). Consider the preference profile p defined, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , s} and r ∈ {1, . . . , h j }, by
Then
a contradiction.
Note that (5) obviously implies (4), and that (4) and (5) are equivalent if one among the elements of Z has size greater than 1. Moreover, considering Y = {H} and Z = {N }, both (4) and (5) are equivalent to (3). As a consequence, Theorem 7(i) implies the "only if" part of Theorem 6.
Let us present now the main result of the paper. It shows that, considering partitions of individuals and alternatives satisfying the arithmetical conditions described in Theorem 7, there exists a resolute refinement which is anonymous and neutral with respect to the given partitions [and immune to the reversal bias] for any scc having the same properties. Differently from Theorem 7, the proof of this result is quite technical and will be presented in Section 6 as a consequence of the theory developed in Section 5.
is Y -anonymous and Z-neutral and (4) holds true, then C admits a resolute refinement which is Y -anonymous, Z-neutral.
(ii) If C ∈ C is Y -anonymous, Z-neutral and immune to the reversal bias and (5) holds true, then C admits a resolute refinement which is Y -anonymous, Z-neutral and immune to the reversal bias.
Note that if (3) holds true, then (4) and (5) are both satisfied for Y = {H} and Z = {N }. As a consequence, from Theorem 8 we get that (3) implies that every scc which is anonymous and neutral [and immune to the reversal bias] admits a resolute refinement which is anonymous and neutral [and immune to the reversal bias]. That shows, in particular, that Theorem 8(i) implies the "if" part of Theorem 6.
In order to better understand how Theorem 8 can be applied in concrete situations, let us consider a committee whose purpose is to select a unique winner among a certain set of candidates. Assume that the members of a committee have already found an agreement on the use of a certain scc C with C anonymous and neutral [and immune to the reversal bias]. If C is not resolute, then the committee members need to determine a tie-breaking rule, that is, a resolute refinement of C. By Theorem 8, if the characteristics of committee members and candidates naturally suggest to divide them in groups satisfying (4) [(5)], a resolute refinement of C which is anonymous and neutral with respect to the considered partitions [and immune to the reversal bias] can be designed. As a remarkable case, assume that the committee has an individual, say individual i, having a special role in the committee. That happens, for instance, when the committee has a president. In that case, it is reasonable to assume that the decision power of the president may be potentially different from the one of any other member in the committee. That leads to consider the partition of H given by Y = {{i}, H \ {i}} which determines the groups of people equally influencing the outcome of the decision process. Considering now the partition Z = {N } of N , that is giving no exogenous advantage to any alternative, we have that Y and Z satisfy (5) and so also (4). Then Theorem 8 applies and we know that there exists a resolute refinement of C which is Y -anonymous and neutral [and immune to the reversal bias].
As a final remark, we stress that, in general, resolute refinements identified by Theorem 8 may be a lot, so that it can be difficult to discriminate among them. However, the theory developed in Section 5 provides a method to potentially build and count all those refinements. That makes the comparison among them much easier. In order to describe how such a method works, in Section 6.2, we build and count all resolute refinements which are anonymous, neutral and immune to the reversal bias of the Pareto, the Borda, the Copeland, the Minimax and the Kemeny sccs when individuals are five and alternatives are three. In Section 6.3.1 we consider instead the case with three individuals and three alternatives and we analyse, for each of the previously mentioned sccs, all the resolute refinement which are {{1, 2}, {3}}-anonymous, neutral and immune to the reversal bias. In that example, individual 3 is distinguished from individuals 1 and 2 who instead are indistinguishable.
General theory
In this large section we develop the general theory behind our results. The concept of action of a group on a set is the main tool used (see Jacobson, 1974 , Section 1.12).
U-consistent resolute sccs
Let F denote the set of resolute sccs. Clearly F ⊆ C and each resolute sccs can be naturally identified with a social choice function, that is, a function f from P to N . We will adopt that identification throughout the rest of the paper.
Let C ∈ C. Denote by C C the set of refinements of C, and by F C the set F ∩ C C of the resolute refinements of C. Each resolute refinement of C is identified with a social choice function f : P → N such that, for every p ∈ P, f (p) ∈ C(p).
Let U be a subgroup of G. We say that C is U -consistent if, for every p ∈ P and (ϕ, ψ, ρ) ∈ U ,
Note that condition (9) is equivalent to
The set of U -consistent sccs is denoted by
We also set C U C = C C ∩ C U and F U C = F C ∩ F U . Each scc in F U C will be called a U -consistent resolute refinement of C and identified with a social choice function f : P → N such that, for every p ∈ P, both (7) and (11) hold true.
The concept of consistency of a scc with respect to a subgroup U of G is able to catch interesting requirements for sccs through a suitable choice of the subgroup U . In particular, for every partition Y of H, C is Y -anonymous if and only if C ∈ C V (Y )×{id}×{id} ; for every partition Z of N , C is Z-neutral if and only if C ∈ C {id}×W (Z)×{id} ; C is immune to the reversal bias if and only if C ∈ C {id}×{id}×Ω .
The action of G on the set of preference profiles
The following proposition, proved in Bubboloni and Gori (2015, Proposition 2), shows that any subgroup U of G naturally acts on the set of preference profiles P. Recall that this means that there exists a homomorphism from U to Sym.
Proposition 9. Let U ≤ G. Then: (i) for every p ∈ P and (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 ), (ϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 2 ) ∈ U , we have p (ϕ1ϕ2,ψ1ψ2,ρ1ρ2) = (p (ϕ2,ψ2,ρ2) ) (ϕ1,ψ1,ρ1) ;
(ii) the function α : U → Sym(P) defined, for every (ϕ, ψ, ρ) ∈ U , by α(ϕ, ψ, ρ) : P → P, p → p (ϕ,ψ,ρ) , is well defined and it is an action of the group U on the set P.
Proposition 10 below is a first interesting consequence of Proposition 9. In particular, it says that, given a scc C, a partition Y of H and a partition Z of N , we have that C is Y -anonymous and Z-neutral if and only if C ∈ C V (Y )×W (Z)×{id} ; C is Y -anonymous and immune to the reversal bias if and only if C ∈ C V (Y )×{id}×Ω ; C is Z-neutral and immune to the reversal bias if and only if C ∈ C {id}×W (Z)×Ω ; C is Y -anonymous, Z-neutral and immune to the reversal bias if and only if C ∈ C G .
Before stating Proposition 10, recall that if X is a subset of a group G, the subgroup of G generated by X is defined as the intersection of all the subgroups of G containing X and it is denoted by X . It is well known that X consists of all the finite products of elements in X. If X 1 , X 2 are subsets of G, we write X 1 , X 2 instead of X 1 ∪ X 2 . For further details see Jacobson (1974, Section 1.5).
Proposition 10. For every
Proof. Since U 1 , U 2 ≤ G contains both U 1 and U 2 , we immediately get C U1,U2 ⊆ C U1 ∩ C U2 . Let us now fix C ∈ C U1 ∩ C U2 and prove C ∈ C U1,U2 . Define, for every k ∈ N, the set U 1 , U 2 k of the elements in U 1 , U 2 that can be written as product of k elements of U 1 ∪ U 2 . Then we have U 1 , U 2 = k∈N U 1 , U 2 k and to get C ∈ C U1,U2 it is enough to show the two following facts:
(a) for every k ∈ N, for every p ∈ P and g = (ϕ, ψ, id) ∈ U 1 , U 2 k , (8) holds true;
(13) (b) for every k ∈ N, p ∈ P and g = (ϕ, ψ, ρ 0 ) ∈ U 1 , U 2 k , (9) holds true.
First of all, for every g = (ϕ, ψ, ρ) ∈ G, define g = (ϕ, ψ, id) ∈ G. We start showing that, for every k ∈ N,
If ρ = id, there is nothing to prove. So assume ρ = ρ 0 . Since, for every i ∈ {1, 2}, we have that (14) surely holds for k = 1. If k ≥ 2, pick g = g 1 · · · g k = (ϕ, ψ, ρ 0 ) ∈ U 1 , U 2 k , where g 1 , . . . , g k ∈ U 1 ∪ U 2 . Since ρ 0 has order two, the number of j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that the third component of g j is ρ 0 is odd. Pick j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that g j = (ϕ j , ψ j , ρ 0 ). By the case k = 1, we have that g j = (ϕ j , ψ j , id) ∈ U 1 ∪ U 2 , so that g = g 1 . . . g j−1 g j g j+1 . . . g k ∈ U 1 , U 2 k and its first and second components are equal to those of g. Moreover, the number of factors in g having as third component ρ 0 is even, which gives g = (ϕ, ψ, id). We now show (a), by induction on k. If k = 1, we have g ∈ U 1 , U 2 1 = U 1 ∪ U 2 and so (13) is guaranteed by C ∈ C U1 ∩ C U2 . Assume (13) up to some k ∈ N and show that it holds also for k + 1. Let p ∈ P and g = (ϕ, ψ, id) ∈ U 1 , U 2 k+1 . Then there exist g * = (ϕ * , ψ * , ρ * ) ∈ U 1 , U 2 k and g 1 = (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 ) ∈ U 1 ∪ U 2 such that g = g 1 g * = (ϕ 1 ϕ * , ψ 1 ψ * , ρ 1 ρ * ). We want to show that C(p g ) = ψ 1 ψ * C(p). Note that g = g 1 g * and that, by (14), g * ∈ U 1 , U 2 k and g 1 ∈ U 1 ∪ U 2 . Then, using (12) and applying the inductive hypothesis for (13) both to g 1 and to g * , we get C(p g ) = C(p g 1 g * ) = C((p g * ) g 1 ) = ψ 1 C(p g * ) = ψ 1 ψ * C(p).
We next show (b). Let k ∈ N, p ∈ P, g = (ϕ, ψ, ρ 0 ) ∈ U 1 , U 2 k and |C(p)| = 1. We need to show that C(p g ) = ψC(p). First of all note that, since U 1 , U 2 contains an element with third component ρ 0 , then we necessarily have R 1 = Ω or R 2 = Ω, so that (id, id, ρ 0 ) ∈ U 1 ∪ U 2 . Moreover, we can express g as g = g (id, id, ρ 0 ) and, by (14), g ∈ U 1 , U 2 k . Thus, by (12) and (a), we have C(p g ) = C((p (id,id,ρ0) ) g ) = ψC(p (id,id,ρ0) ). On the other hand, since (id, id, ρ 0 ) ∈ U 1 ∪ U 2 and C ∈ C U1 ∩ C U2 , we get C(p (id,id,ρ0) ) = C(p) and so C(p g ) = ψC(p (id,id,ρ0) ) = ψC(p) as required.
Finally, as a consequence of C U1 ∩ C U2 = C U1,U2 , we also have that
As an immediate consequence of Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 10 we get the following result. (c) (h, n) ∈ {(4, 4), (5, 4), (7, 4), (5, 5)}.
Proposition 9 also allows to use notation and results concerning the action of a group on a set. We recall the basic facts that we are going to use.
Fix U ≤ G. For every p ∈ P, the set p U = {p g ∈ P : g ∈ U } is called the U -orbit of p and the subgroup of U defined by Stab U (p) = {g ∈ U : p g = p} is called the stabilizer of p in U . It is well known that the set P U = {p U : p ∈ P} of the U -orbits is a partition of P. We use P U as set of indexes and denote its elements with j. A vector (p j ) j∈P U ∈ × j∈P U P is called a system of representatives of the U -orbits if, for every j ∈ P U , p j ∈ j. The set of the systems of representatives of the U -orbits is denoted by S(U ). If (p j ) j∈P U ∈ S(U ), then, for every p ∈ P, there exist j ∈ P U and (ϕ, ψ, ρ) ∈ U such that p = p j (ϕ,ψ,ρ) . Note that if p j1 (ϕ1,ψ1,ρ1) = p j2 (ϕ2,ψ2,ρ2) for some j 1 , j 2 ∈ P U and some (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 ), (ϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 2 ) ∈ U , then j 1 = j 2 and, by (12), (ϕ −1 2 ϕ 1 , ψ −1 2 ψ 1 , ρ −1 2 ρ 1 ) ∈ Stab U (p j1 ). The stabilizer of p in U evolves in a natural way through the action. Namely for every p ∈ P and g ∈ U , we have Stab U (p g ) = g Stab U (p)g −1 .
This implies that if V is a normal subgroup of U and p ∈ P, then Stab U (p) ≤ V if and only if Stab U (p g ) ≤ V for all g ∈ U . Now, being S h ×S n ×{id} normal in G, by an elementary group theory result, we have that U ∩ (S h × S n × {id}) is normal in U . Thus, the above argument guarantees that, for every j ∈ P U , exactly one of the two following conditions holds true:
We then define
Of course, P U 1 ∪ P U 2 = P U and P U 1 ∩ P U 2 = ∅. In particular, P U 1 and P U 2 cannot be both empty. Obviously, if U ≤ S h × S n × {id}, then P U 2 = ∅ and P U = P U 1 = ∅. The sets P U 1 and P U 2 play an important role to check whether two given U -consistent sccs are equal, as shown by the following results.
Proposition 12. Let U ≤ S h × S n × {id} and C, C ′ ∈ C U . Assume that there exists (p j ) j∈P U ∈ S(U ) such that C(p j ) = C ′ (p j ) for all j ∈ P U . Then C = C ′ .
Proof. Let p ∈ P and show that C(p) = C ′ (p). We know there exist j ∈ P U and (ϕ, ψ, id) ∈ U such that p = p j (ϕ,ψ,id) . Then,
Proposition 13. Let U ≤ G such that U ≤ S h × S n × {id} and C, C ′ ∈ C U . Assume that there exist (p j ) j∈P U ∈ S(U ) and (ϕ * , ψ * , ρ 0 ) ∈ U such that C(p j ) = C ′ (p j ) for all j ∈ P U and C(p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) = C ′ (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) for all j ∈ P U 1 . Then C = C ′ . Proof. Let p ∈ P and show that C(p) = C ′ (p). Let j ∈ P U be the unique orbit such that p ∈ j. If there exists (ϕ, ψ, id) ∈ U such that p = p j (ϕ,ψ,id) , then we get C(p) = C ′ (p) operating as in (17). So, assume that, for every (ϕ, ψ, ρ) ∈ U such that p = p j (ϕ,ψ,ρ) , we have ρ = ρ 0 .
We show that (18) implies Stab U (p j ) ≤ S h × S n × {id}. Indeed, suppose by contradiction that there exists (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 0 ) ∈ Stab U (p j ). Pick (ϕ, ψ, ρ 0 ) ∈ U such that p = p j (ϕ,ψ,ρ0) and note that, by (12),
which contradicts (18). As a consequence, j ∈ P U 1 and thus C(p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) = C ′ (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ). Pick again (ϕ, ψ, ρ 0 ) ∈ U such that p = p j (ϕ,ψ,ρ0) and note that, by (12), p = p j (ϕ,ψ,ρ0) = (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) (ϕϕ −1 * ,ψψ −1 * ,id) so that, since C and C ′ are U -consistent, we finally obtain C(p) = C (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) (ϕϕ −1 * ,ψψ −1 * ,id) = ψψ −1 * C(p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) = ψψ −1 * C ′ (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) = C ′ (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) (ϕϕ −1 * ,ψψ −1 * ,id) = C ′ (p).
Propositions 12 and 13 indicate that the consistency level of a scc is a tool for identifying it. Indeed, let C, C ′ ∈ C and suppose that we are interested to know whether C = C ′ . Once C and C ′ are proved to be both in C U for a suitable U ≤ G, it suffices to check whether the equality C(p) = C ′ (p) holds true on a small subset of P, which essentially agrees with a system of U -orbits representatives. Since the largest is U , the smallest the number of U -orbits is, dealing with the largest possible U reduces the number of checks to be done. Bubboloni and Gori (2015) introduce the concept of regular subgroup to deal with symmetric social welfare functions. A subgroup U of G is said to be regular if, for every p ∈ P, there exists ψ * ∈ S n conjugate to ρ 0 such that
Regular subgroups
Note that, within our notation, two permutations σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ S n are conjugate if there exists u ∈ S n such that σ 1 = uσ 2 u −1 . The following result, which is proved in Bubboloni and Gori (2015, Theorem 14 and Lemma 17) , identifies an interesting and quite large class of regular subgroups of G.
In particular, G is regular if and only if gcd(h, n!) = 1.
Theorem 15 below, which is a corollary of Theorems 18 and 20 proved in the next sections, clearly shows the importance of concept of regular subgroup in the context of sccs.
Theorem 15. Let U ≤ G be regular. Then each U -consistent scc admits a resolute U -consistent refinement.
Let us now collect some facts about regular subgroups that we are going to use in the sequel. Recall that the subsets P U 1 and P U 2 of P U are defined in (15) and (16) respectively.
Lemma 16. Let U ≤ G be regular. Then, we have ψ = ψ * as well as ψ = ψ * * , so that ψ * = ψ * * .
(iii) Simply observe that, for every p ∈ P, Stab W (p) = W ∩ Stab U (p).
In the Appendix, under the assumption that U is a regular subgroup of G, we will discuss when P U 1 = ∅ or P U 2 = ∅.
Existence of U-consistent resolute refinements for U ≤ S h × S n × {id}
In this section we focus on the set F U C , where U is a regular subgroup of G included in S h ×S n ×{id}, and C is a U -consistent scc.
Proposition 17. Let U ≤ S h × S n × {id} be regular, (p j ) j∈P U ∈ S(U ) and C ∈ C U . For every j ∈ P U , let x j ∈ C(p j ). Then there exists a unique f ∈ F U C such that, for every j ∈ P U , f (p j ) = x j . Proof. Let us consider f ∈ F defined, for every p ∈ P, as follows. Given p ∈ P, consider the unique j ∈ P U such that p ∈ j and the nonempty set U p = {(ϕ, ψ, id) ∈ U : p = p j (ϕ,ψ,id) }. Pick (ϕ, ψ, id) ∈ U p and let f (p) = ψ(x j ). We need to prove that the value of f (p) does not depend on the particular element chosen in U p . Indeed, let (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , id), (ϕ 2 , ψ 2 , id) ∈ U p and recall that (ϕ −1 2 ϕ 1 , ψ −1 2 ψ 1 , id) ∈ Stab U (p j ). Since U is regular, that gives ψ 1 = ψ 2 and, in particular, ψ 1 (x j ) = ψ 2 (x j ).
We show that f satisfies all the desired properties. First of all, since U ≤ G, we have (id, id, id) ∈ U and thus the definition of f immediately implies f (p j ) = x j .
Let us now prove that f ∈ F U . Consider then p ∈ P and (ϕ, ψ, id) ∈ U and show that f (p (ϕ,ψ,id) ) = ψf (p). Let p = p j (ϕ1,ψ1,id) for suitable j ∈ P U and (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , id) ∈ U . Thus, f (p) = ψ 1 (x j ) and, by (12), f (p (ϕ,ψ,id) ) = f (p j (ϕϕ1,ψψ1,id) ) = ψψ 1 (x j ) = ψf (p).
Let us next prove that f ∈ F C . Consider then p ∈ P and show that f (p) ∈ C(p). Let p = p j (ϕ1,ψ1,id) for suitable j ∈ P U and (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , id) ∈ U . Thus, f (p) = ψ 1 (x j ) and, since C is U -consistent, ψ 1 (x j ) ∈ ψ 1 C(p j ) = C(p j (ϕ1,ψ1,id) ) = C(p).
Finally, in order to prove uniqueness, let f ′ ∈ F U C ⊆ C U such that f ′ (p j ) = x j for all j ∈ P U . Then f ′ and f coincides on (p j ) j∈P U ∈ S(U ) and Proposition 12 applies giving f ′ = f.
be the function which associates with every (x j ) j∈P U ∈ × j∈P U C(p j ) the unique f ∈ F U C defined in Proposition 17. Of course, Φ depends on U , (p j ) j∈P U and C but we do not emphasize that dependence in the notation. Note also that Φ is injective.
Moreover, we have that
and, in particular,
Since, for every j ∈ P U , C(p j ) = ∅, it finally follows that F U C = ∅.
In this section we focus on the set F U C , where U is a regular subgroup of G not included in S h × S n × {id} and C is a U -consistent scc. We start with some crucial definitions.
Let U ≤ G be regular such that U ≤ S h ×S n ×{id}, C ∈ C U , (p j ) j∈P U ∈ S(U ) and (ϕ * , ψ * , ρ 0 ) ∈ U . Define, for every j ∈ P U 1 , the set
and, for every j ∈ P U 2 , the set
where ψ j is the unique element in S n such that
Note that that uniqueness of ψ j is guaranteed by Lemma 16(ii). Next if P U 1 = ∅, then define
. Of course, all the sets above defined depend on U , (p j ) j∈P U , (ϕ * , ψ * , ρ 0 ) and C but we do not emphasize that dependence in the notation.
Proposition 19. Let U ≤ G be regular such that U ≤ S h × S n × {id}, (p j ) j∈P U ∈ S(U ), (ϕ * , ψ * , ρ 0 ) ∈ U and C ∈ C U . For every j ∈ P U 1 , let (y j , z j ) ∈ A 1 C (p j ) and, for every j ∈ P U 2 , let x j ∈ A 2 C (p j ). Then there exists a unique f ∈ F U C such that f (p j ) = y j and f (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) = z j for all j ∈ P U 1 , and f (p j ) = x j for all j ∈ P U 2 . Proof. Given j ∈ P U 2 , consider the set K U (p j ) = σ ∈ S n : ψ j = σρ 0 σ −1 , where ψ j is defined in (23). Since U is regular, K U (p j ) is nonempty so that we can choose an element σ j in K U (p j ). Note that, for every j ∈ P U 2 and (ϕ, ψ, ρ) ∈ Stab U (p j ), we have ψ = σ j ρσ −1 j . Let us consider then f ∈ F defined, for every p ∈ P, as follows. Given p ∈ P, consider the unique j ∈ P U such that p ∈ j and the nonempty set U p = {(ϕ, ψ, ρ) ∈ U : p = p j (ϕ,ψ,ρ) }. Pick (ϕ, ψ, ρ) ∈ U p and let
We need to prove that the value of f (p) does not depend on the particular element chosen in U p . Indeed, let (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 ), (ϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 2 ) ∈ U p and recall that (ϕ −1
. We show that f satisfies all the desired properties. First of all, since U ≤ G, we have (id, id, id) ∈ U and thus the definition of f immediately implies f (p j ) = y j and f (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) = z j for all j ∈ P U 1 , and f (p j ) = x j for all j ∈ P U 2 . Let us now prove that f ∈ F U . Consider then p ∈ P and (ϕ, ψ, ρ) ∈ U and show that if ρ = id, then f (p (ϕ,ψ,ρ) ) = ψf (p), while if ρ = ρ 0 , then f (p (ϕ,ψ,ρ) ) = ψf (p). Let p = p j (ϕ1,ψ1,ρ1) for suitable j ∈ P U and (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 ) ∈ U .
-If j ∈ P U 1 and ρ 1 = id, then f (p) = ψ 1 (y j ). By (12), if ρ = id, then f (p (ϕ,ψ,ρ) ) = f (p j (ϕϕ1,ψψ1,id) ) = ψψ 1 (y j ) = ψf (p), while if ρ = ρ 0 , then f (p (ϕ,ψ,ρ) 
. As a consequence, if ρ = id, we get f (p (ϕ,ψ,ρ) ) = ψf (p). If instead ρ = ρ 0 , we have that f (p (ϕ,ψ,ρ) 
However, the last relation holds true since σ j ρ 0 σ −1 j = ψ j and ψ j (x j ) = x j because x j ∈ A 2 C (p j ). Let us next prove that f ∈ F C . Consider then p ∈ P and show that f (p) ∈ C(p). Let p = p j (ϕ1,ψ1,ρ1) for suitable j ∈ P U and (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 ) ∈ U .
-If j ∈ P U 1 and ρ 1 = id, then f (p) = ψ 1 (y j ) and, by the U -consistency of C, ψ 1 (y j ) ∈ ψ 1 C(p j ) = C(p j (ϕ1,ψ1,id) ) = C(p).
-If j ∈ P U 1 and ρ 1 = ρ 0 , then f (p) = ψ 1 ψ −1 * (z j ) and, by (12) and the U -consistency of C, ψ 1 ψ −1 * (z j ) ∈ ψ 1 ψ −1 * C(p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) = C (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) (ϕ1ϕ −1 * ,ψ1ψ −1 * ,id) = C(p j (ϕ1,ψ1,ρ0) ) = C(p).
-If j ∈ P U 2 and ρ 1 = id, then f (p) = ψ 1 (x j ) and, by the U -consistency of C, ψ 1 (x j ) ∈ ψ 1 C(p j ) = C(p j (ϕ1,ψ1,id) ) = C(p).
-If j ∈ P U 2 and ρ 1 = ρ 0 , then let (ϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 0 ) ∈ U be such that p j (ϕ2,ψ2,ρ0) = p j . By (12), we have p = p j (ϕ1,ψ1,ρ0) = (p j (ϕ2,ψ2,ρ0) ) (ϕ1ϕ −1
Thus, f (p) = ψ 1 ψ −1 2 (x j ) and, by the U -consistency of C,
Finally, in order to prove uniqueness, let f ′ ∈ F U C such that f ′ (p j ) = y j and f ′ (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) = z j for all j ∈ P U 1 , and f ′ (p j ) = x j for all j ∈ P U 2 . Then f, f ′ ∈ C U realize f (p j ) = f ′ (p j ) for all j ∈ P U and f (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) = f ′ (p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) for all j ∈ P U 1 . Hence, the thesis follows from Proposition 13.
Of course, Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 and Ψ 3 depend on U , (p j ) j∈P U , (ϕ * , ψ * , ρ 0 ) and C but we do not emphasize that dependence in the notation. Note also that Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 and Ψ 3 are injective.
Theorem 20. Let U ≤ G be regular such that U ≤ S h × S n × {id}, (p j ) j∈P U ∈ S(U ), (ϕ * , ψ * , ρ 0 ) ∈ U and C ∈ C U . Then
Proof. Assume first that P U 1 and P U 2 are both nonempty. Consider f ∈ F U C and note that
We complete the proof showing that, for every j ∈ P U 1 , A 1 C (p j ) = ∅ and that, for every j ∈ P U 2 , A 2 C (p j ) = ∅. The fact that A 1 C (p j ) has at least one element for all j ∈ P U 1 is an immediate consequence of the U -consistency of C. Assume now that there exists j ∈ P U 2 such that A 2 C (p j ) = ∅ and consider ψ j as defined in (23). Then, for every x ∈ C(p j ), we have that ψ j (x) = x. On the other hand, being ψ j a conjugate of ρ 0 , it has the same number of fixed points of ρ 0 . Thus, if n is even, then ψ j has no fixed point and so C(p j ) = ∅, a contradiction. If instead n is odd, we have that ψ j has a unique fixed point x 0 and so C(p j ) = {x 0 }. Pick (ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 0 ) ∈ Stab U (p j ). By the regularity of U , we get ψ 1 = ψ j and thus ψ 1 (x 0 ) = x 0 . It follows that ψ −1 1 C(p j ) = C(p j ). Now, by (12) and the U -consistency of C, we finally deduce that C(p j (ϕ * ,ψ * ,ρ0) ) = C (p j (ϕ1,ψ1,ρ0) ) (ϕ * ϕ −1
, which contradicts (9).
The case P U 1 = ∅ and the case P U 2 = ∅ are similar and then omitted.
Some applications
In this section we mainly apply the general theory about the concept of consistency to study the properties of anonymity and neutrality with respect to partitions as well as the immunity to the reversal bias. In particular, we describe some concrete situations involving the classical sccs considered in Section 3. In what follows we denote by C * the set {P ar, Bor, Cop, Kem, M in}.
Proof of Theorem 8
We are going to prove Theorem 8 by proving Theorem 21 below. Indeed, on the basis of the notation introduced along the paper and Proposition 10, Theorem 21 is nothing but a rephrase of Theorems 7 and 8. More precisely, statement (i) refers to Theorem 7, while statement (ii) refers to Theorem 8. Since statement (i) has been already proved in Section 4, we are left with proving statement (ii) only. then (20) . By Theorem 14, (20) implies that U is regular. If R = {id}, then we apply Theorem 18 and we get F U C = ∅. If instead R = Ω, then we apply Theorem 20 and we get again F U C = ∅.
Five individuals and three alternatives
Consider five individuals (h = 5) and three alternatives (n = 3) so that G = S 5 × S 3 × Ω. Since gcd(5, 3!) = 1, Theorem 14 guarantees that G is regular. Thus, by Theorem 20, for every C ∈ C G , we have F G C = ∅ and the elements in F G C can be explicitly build and count. Here we determine F G C for C ∈ C * . Observe that, being n = 3, Proposition 11 guarantees that C * ⊆ C G P ar . In order to start the concrete construction of the elements in F G C , we first need a system of representatives of the G-orbits. We choose the system p 1 , . . . , p 26 built in Bubboloni and Gori (2015, Section 7 .2) and, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , 26}, we denote the orbit of p j by j. Thus, P G = {1, . . . , 26} and a simple but tedious computation shows that 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24} , 3, 6, 9, 13, 17, 19, 20, 25, 26} . Next, we choose (ϕ * , ψ * , ρ 0 ) = (id, id, ρ 0 ) and, for every C ∈ C * , we compute C(p j ) for all j ∈ P G , and C(p j (id,id,ρ0) ) for all j ∈ P G 1 . Doing that, we find out that Kem(p j ) = M in(p j ) for all j ∈ P G , as well as Kem(p j (id,id,ρ0) ) = M in(p j (id,id,ρ0) ) for all j ∈ P G 1 . Thus, Proposition 13 gives Kem = M in. Next we compute, for every j ∈ P G 1 , the set A 1 C (p j ) defined in (21) and, for every j ∈ P G 2 , the set A 2 C (p j ) defined in (22). Those computations are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 
From those tables, by Theorem 20, we immediately get every element in F G C for all C ∈ C * . Indeed, once decided, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , 26}, one of the entries corresponding to p j , we exactly identify an element in F G C just using the definition given in (24). In particular, we deduce
Note that the two G-consistent refinements of Kem depend only on which alternative between 1 and 3 is associated with the following preference profile p 25 =   1 1 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 1 3 3 1 1 2   The choice of 3 might be considered more appropriate since the majority of individuals prefer 3 to 1.
Committees with a distinguished individual
We have observed in Section 4 that, if individual i has a special role in the committee, then Y = {{i}, H \ {i}} is a natural partition of individuals to deal with. Let C ∈ C and consider C i , C i ∈ C defined, for every p ∈ P, by Of course, C i and C i are resolute refinements of C. Note that C i is consistent with interpreting individual i as the president of the committee who has the power to break ties according to his/her own preferences, while C i does not seem to have any natural interpretation. If C is Y -anonymous [neutral], it is easily checked that C i and C i are both Y -anonymous [neutral] . If instead C is immune to the reversal bias, it is not generally guaranteed that C i and C i are immune to the reversal bias too. Indeed, consider, for instance, (h, n) = (5, 4) and the Minimax scc. Recall that, by Proposition 3, M in is immune to the reversal bias. Given now p,p ∈ P defined by p =     4 4 4 2 1 2 3 1 3 2 3 1 2 1 3 1 2 3 4 4     ,p =     1 4 4 2 2 2 3 1 3 2 3 1 2 1 3 4 2 3 4 1     we have that M in(p) = M in(p) = {4} and M in(p (id,id,ρ0) ) = M in(p (id,id,ρ0) ) = {1, 3, 4}. Then we have M in 5 (p) = M in 5 (p (id,id,ρ0) ) = M in 5 (p) = M in 5 (p (id,id,ρ0) ) = {4}, so that M in 5 and M in 5 suffers the reversal bias. However, note that, due to Theorem 8, we know that M in surely admits a resolute refinement which is {{5}, H \ {5}}-anonymous, neutral and immune to the reversal bias.
Remarkably, if C satisfies a suitable stronger version of immunity to the reversal bias, C i and C i can be proved to be immune to the reversal bias. Accordingly to Bubboloni and Gori (2016) we say that C ∈ C is immune to the reversal bias of type 3 if, for every p ∈ P, C(p) ∩ C(p (id,id,ρ0 ) ) = ∅ implies C(p) = N . Note that if C is resolute then the definitions of immunity to the reversal bias and immunity to the reversal bias of type 3 coincide.
Proposition 22. Let i ∈ H and C ∈ C be immune to the reversal bias of type 3. Then C i and C i are immune to the reversal bias.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists p ∈ P and x * ∈ N such that C i (p) = C i (p (id,id,ρ0) ) = {x * }.
Then, in particular, x * ∈ C(p) ∩ C(p (id,id,ρ0 ) ) and, since C is immune to the reversal bias of type 3, we have C(p) = C(p (id,id,ρ0) ) = N . Being x * ∈ C i (p) we then have x * pi y for all y ∈ N. On the other hand, being x * ∈ C i (p (id,id,ρ0) ) we also have x * piρ0 y, that is, y pi x * for all y ∈ N . Since p i is antisymmetric, we then get that x * is the only element in N , against n ≥ 2. An analogous argument works for C i . Proof. We know that Bor and Cop are efficient, anonymous and neutral. By Proposition 3 in Bubboloni and Gori (2016) , we have that Bor and Cop are immune to the reversal bias of type 3. Thus, the thesis follows applying Proposition 22 and recalling that any refinement of an efficient scc is efficient.
Three individuals and three alternatives
Consider now three individuals (h = 3) and three alternatives (n = 3) so that G = S 3 ×S 3 ×Ω. Since gcd(3, 3!) = 1, G is not regular and, by Theorem 7, there exists no resolute, efficient, anonymous and neutral scc. Thus, F G C = ∅ for all C ∈ C * . Consider then the partition Y = {{1, 2}, {3}} of H distinguishing individual 3 and the partition Z = {N } of N and define U = V (Y ) × W (Z) × Ω. By Theorem 14, U is regular so that, by Theorem 20, for every C ∈ C U , we have that F U C = ∅ and all the elements in F U C can be explicitly built and counted. Here we determine F U C for all C ∈ C * . Observe that, being n = 3, Proposition 11 guarantees that C * ⊆ C G so that C * ⊆ C U .
As a system of representatives of the U -orbits, we consider the system p 1 , . . . , p 13 built in Bubboloni and Gori (2015, Section 7.1) and, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , 13}, we denote the orbit of p j by j. Thus, P U = {1, . . . , 13} and a simple computation shows that 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 , 13}, P U 2 = {1, 2, 5, 6, 7}.
Next, we choose (ϕ * , ψ * , ρ 0 ) = (id, id, ρ 0 ) and, for every C ∈ C * , we compute C(p j ) for all j ∈ P U , and C(p j (id,id,ρ0) ) for all j ∈ P U 1 . Doing that, we find out that Cop(p j ) = Kem(p j ) = M in(p j ) for all j ∈ P U , as well as Cop(p j (id,id,ρ0) ) = Kem(p j (id,id,ρ0) ) = M in(p j (id,id,ρ0) ) for all j ∈ P U 1 . Thus, by Proposition 13, we have Cop = Kem = M in. In particular, those sccs admit the same resolute refinements.
Next we compute, for every j ∈ P G 1 , the set A 1 C (p j ) defined in (21) and, for every j ∈ P U 2 , the set A 2 C (p j ) defined in (22) . Note that here A 2 C (p j ) = C(p j ) \ {2} because ψ j = ρ 0 = (13) for all j ∈ P U 2 . Those computations are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 , where ∆ is defined by (26). From those tables, by Theorem 20, we immediately get each element in F U C for all C ∈ C * as described in Section 6.2.
In particular, we deduce
and |F U P ar | = 2 10 3 5 , |F G Bor | = 8, |F U Cop | = |F U Kem | = |F U Min | = 2. Note that the two U -consistent refinements of Cop depend only on which alternative between 1 and 3 is associated with the preference profile p 6 =   2 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 3 
(1,2), (1,3), (3,2) (1,2), (3,2) (3,2) p 4
(1,2), (1,3) (1,2) (1,2) p 8
(1,3), (2,3) (1,3) (1,3) p 9
(1,3),(1,2), (2,1), (2,3) (1,3),(2,3) (1,3) p 10 ∆ (3,2) (3,2) p 11 ∆ (1,2) (1,2) p 12 ∆ (1,3) (1,3) p 13
(1,3), (2,1), (2,3) (2,3) (2,3) Table 3 : Computation of A 1 C (p j ) with C ∈ C * and j ∈ P U 1 .
A 2 P ar (p j ) A 2 Bor (p j ), A 2 Cop (p j ), A 2 Kem (p j ), A 2 Min (p j ) p 1 1 1 p 2 1, 3 3 p 5 1, 3 1 p 6 1, 3 1, 3 p 7 1 1 
A Appendix
Given U be a regular subgroup of G, we characterize here when P U 1 = ∅ or P U 2 = ∅. Note that, obviously, if U is a regular subgroup of G with U ≤ S h ×S n ×{id}, then P U 2 = ∅ and P U = P U 1 = ∅. An example of such a kind of subgroup is S h × {id} × {id}. On the other hand, there surely exist regular subgroups of G not contained in S h × S n × {id} like, for instance, {id} × {id} × Ω and (ϕ, ρ 0 , ρ 0 ) , where ϕ ∈ S h is fixed. The following proposition is about subgroups of that type.
